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ABSTRACT
This paper presents selected relevant research results from the EU FP7 project VITRUV
(“Vulnerability Identification Tools for Resilience Enhancements of Urban Environments”), relating
to methods to integrate consideration on culture and ethics aspects, including citizen acceptance, into
conceptual urban planning. While security aspects do not always figure prominently in urban
planning, much of that planning has effects on citizens’ security. Security aspects obviously have an
influence on how built environment is changed and developed. Conversely, the way in which built
environment is changed and developed influences the security of infrastructures and society as a
whole, both in manifest and in latent ways. Putting one focus on ‘soft’, such as cultural, aspects in
urban planning, related parts of VITRUV will help urban planners identify how their planning
decisions may directly or indirectly affect societal security. In this context, security means a high level
of safeguard for the infrastructure, the supply of goods and services as well as for the commonly
acquired values of a community. By identifying and validating practical methods to integrate social
and cultural aspects in an urban planning tool, project results will facilitate the consideration of the
multiple dimensions of threats and vulnerabilities in their context of urban planning. This among other
things includes appropriate addressing of gaps between ‘factual’ security and citizens’ ‘felt’ security.
Keywords: urban security; comprehensive approach; new urban design; citizen resilience; citizen
acceptance; critical infrastructure protection; social critical infrastructure; societal security
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INTRODUCTION
The vulnerability of urban environments remains an undeveloped theme. With half of the world’s
population currently living in urban centres, and with this figure set to increase to two-thirds by 2050,
the issue of security and citizen safety is of paramount importance and a growing concern. In view of
the growing number of threats from global terrorism, natural disasters or crime, urban planning
practice must incorporate appropriate security measures for vulnerability identification and resilience
enhancements. This also poses challenges for urban research.
This paper presents selected relevant research results from the EU FP7 project VITRUV
(“Vulnerability Identification Tools for Resilience Enhancements of Urban Environments”). 3 The
focus is on:
•

Addressing security aspects in strategic urban planning;

•

Methods to integrate security-relevant considerations on culture, ethics aspects and citizen
acceptance into conceptual planning urban planning; and

•

Methods how this can be done in a citizen involving/activating way.

Structural and social dimensions of a public area overlap each other; therefore, a public space is also a
social place. Urban planning is increasingly considering the fact that public spaces are used by
different types of people, with different necessities, usage and needs. This awareness is important both
from the researcher’s and the practitioner’s point of view, since it contributes to resilience-enhancing
planning, considering the multidimensionality of threats and vulnerabilities present in urban space.
While security aspects have only since recently figured more prominently in urban planning (Boisteau
2006; PluS-EU project; 4 LKA NI 2010; UN-HABITAT 2007a, b), much of that planning has rather
direct effects on citizens’ security. Highlighting of ‘soft’ aspects (such as culture) in urban planning
will help identify how planning decisions may directly or indirectly affect societal security, and what
impact this has on vulnerable and resilient cities.
Security should be a more prominent theme within urban planning. One main reason for this is that
security aspects obviously have an influence on how built environment is changed and developed;
conversely, the way in which built environment is changed and developed influences the security of
infrastructures and of society as a whole, both in manifest and in latent ways (cf. Boisteau 2006).
VITRUV, among other things, seeks to assist planners in understanding and identifying those latent
aspects.
Built environment is intrinsically meaningful. It has its particular “semiotics” (Gottdiener/Hutchinson
2011: 394) that tell about policy, economy, etc. – and also about security. This has a couple of
practical ramifications for strategic urban planning, such as the effect of that planning on public
perception of built environment, and its susceptibility to risk.
Design features of urban infrastructure influence citizens’ perception of the risk that infrastructure is
at, or that it is assumed to mitigate or prevent. Design features also influence the general perception of
criticality of that infrastructure. While urban sociology and socially concerned urban planning have
gained much insight on environments such as “pleasant”, “calming” or “exciting” (cf. Nasar 2011:
168), “secure environments” have been addressed to a far lesser extent.
The “ecological” perspective (Michelson 2011) in urban sociology explores what happens in social
terms as a consequence of the exposure of people to built environment. Possible consequences include
social exclusion of specific parts of the public, as reprimanded by cultural criminology (cf. Garland
2001).
On the bottom line, urban structure has an impact on social processes, and this needs to be addressed
in strategic urban planning (cf. Hannigan 1998). The school of New Urbanism has referred to this as
the “sociospatial perspective”. This means that urban space and society interact, and that “social space
3
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operates as both a product and a producer of changes in the metropolitan environment”
(Gottdiener/Hutchinson 2011: 394; see also 20).
Based on these assumptions about societal security as it applies to urban planning, this paper
summarizes selected results from study work within the VITRUV project. The project as a whole is by
far broader and it also includes the development of a knowledge base (“Urban Securipedia”) as well
as a risk assessment tool (“Securban”) to enable planners:
•

To make well-considered systematic qualitative decisions at the concept stage of design;

•

To analyse the susceptibility of urban spaces (e.g. building types, squares, public transport,
and their functionalities) with respect to new threats at the plan stage of design; and

•

To perform vulnerability analyses of urban spaces by computing the likely damage on
individuals, buildings and traffic infrastructure at the detail stage of design.

All tools will contribute to enabling the development of more robust and resilient space in the field of
urban (re)planning/(re)design/(re)engineering. The leading idea of the VITRUV’s tools is to support
urban planners to deliver urban space less prone to and less affected by attacks and disasters, thus
sustainably improving the security of citizens. Moreover, the tools will have a direct value for
research, including serving as a knowledge base and support for scenario studies.
This paper focuses on the following aspects of a study conducted in support of the tool development
and some of its content:
•

Security culture as concept of reference;

•

Subjective assessment of criticality of infrastructure by citizens, with identified indicators for
assessment of subjective protection requirements of critical infrastructure;

•

Citizen demands and ethics aspects, such as acceptability and acceptance of security-related
urban planning;

•

Resilience as an evolving concept in security research, how it relates to urban research and
planning, and how urban planning can contribute to increasing community resilience.

Results are summarized in the form of security-related missions in urban planning.

SECURITY CULTURE
Following the rise of the paradigm of New Urbanism (e.g. Calthorpe/Fulton 2001) – that is also a main
frame of reference for addressing social and culture aspects in urban planning and to link approaches
from urban planning as well as social sciences and humanities (cf. Gottdiener/Hutchison 2011) –
architecture and planning have essentially included the theme of society and culture. New Urbanism
sets out to overcome the zoning of certain functional areas (typical of the industrial age) that separate
residential from economy and other use. Considering today’s economy, predominantly informationbased and complying with stricter pollution regulations, planning should promote mixed-use
development (e.g. development of residential and economy-related functions) to prevent urban sprawl.
However, this conceptual integration of society into urbanity does not always reflect well the new
levels of social density that will be reached and that may change urban cultures. This includes the
social and cognitive foundations for the perception of insecurity and fear by the citizens. In urban
studies, cultural factors have largely been understood as legal requirements related to upholding
historic landmarks, involving questions such as “Is it legal for a historic preservation commission to
stop an owner from demolishing or even modifying the exterior of a historically significant building?”
(cf. Kayden 2011: 175). Urban research and planning practice should be aware that culture aspects
relevant to security reach beyond that common understanding.
While New Urbanism is committed to a reconciliation of physical infrastructure and community
building, it follows a sort of physical determinism. It assumes that informed, progressive architectural
design per se meliorates human behaviour, reduces insecurity as well as citizens’ feeling thereof, and
increases societal resilience. Although New Urbanism relies on active citizen participation in the
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construction of urban neighbourhoods, it has been criticized by urban sociologists from a cultural
point of view:
“New Urbanists, like many architects, believe that social goals […] can be achieved through the
physical means of design and construction. This is a fallacy. Residents of communities do not
behave in certain ways simply because well-known architects direct them to do so.”
(Gottdiener/Hutchinson 2011: 331)
According to Gottdiener/Hutchinson (2011: 331), many examples of community-enhancing
constructions represent an “elitism of architectural choice” that may eventually increase societal gaps
and perceptions of fear, as well as actual insecurity.
There are several reasons, why it is important to consider security culture aspects in urban planning in
a more diverse as well as comprehensive way: First, culture determines both the behaviour and the
perception of people, and thus determines the (perceived) security. Second, cultural behaviour can be
directed by the surroundings, and thus by the result of urban planning. Third, the framework for urban
planning is also to some extent culturally determined. Consider the following example:
In The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society, cultural criminologist
David Garland identifies cultural and institutional practices to construct artefacts that allow a
continuation of imagined middle-class separation from crime. Garland illustrates the argument with
examples from urban planning, especially the concept of offering citizens new middle-class type
privacy in private public spaces, such as commercial malls based on architectures “to separate out
different ‘types’ of people”, including commercial policing by private companies (Garland 2001: 162).
In fact, culture aspects in urban planning can for the most part be referred to the approach of cultural
criminology. Cultural criminology demurs that while culture is a prominent theme in theoretical and
practical terms, culture entails a concept of vulnerability and resilience that is “rooted in the material
predicament of the actors concerned. It eschews both a social positivism of material conditions and a
cultural positivism of stasis and of essence.” (Hayward/Young 2007: 117)
In security-related accounts, culture is often used as a denominator for everyday living conditions as
well as conditions of social exclusion and in-group/out-group formation. For example, criminological
research has typically identified the following cultural (and socialization-related) factors in relation
with crime occurrence and risk of crime (actual threat) (White/Habibis 2004: 67-68):
•

Cultural norms that define masculinity and act as enablers for the practice of violence by
marginalized young men, who feel themselves excluded from normal paths of enacting the
gender-specific norms to demonstrate virility.

•

Cultural norms that define masculinity and dehumanize people, who derive from the dominant
culture of normalcy (e.g. violence against homosexual males).

•

Political culture providing a breeding ground for hate crimes against people representing
otherness.

•

Ideological constructions of social systems (such as the family) that involve a sense of right of
– even violent – control of men over women.

•

Cultural norms of acceptable violence such as in sports, schools and entertainment, which may
however trigger excesses of violence.

However, different perceptions and disputes about risk and security can be linked to competing
worldviews, as they are paramount in multicultural cities: Conceptions of risk, security and solutions
to security problems vary according to the organization of political and social relations. Risks and
security threats are selected as important because they reinforce established interpretations and
relations within a culture, thus reproducing the symbolic foundations of a community: “Common
values lead to common fears […]. There is no gap between perception and reality.”
(Douglas/Wildavsky 1982: 8)
In other words, there is no risk ‘out there’, but risk is always selected from within a society, based on
cultural backgrounds. Following this interpretation, risk is a ‘social construct’ and cannot be assessed
against a (mistaken) ‘objective’ or ‘factual’ notion of the concept. Rooted in this basic assumption,
security culture (e.g. Siedschlag/Jerković 2008, 2010) is a deeper rooted concept that goes beyond
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those approaches, based on a cognitive concept that looks into how groups of people perceive things
and how this perception can be explained, as well as to some extent predicted and modified. As
mentioned above, the general assumption of cultural approaches to the perception of (in)security is
that things, such as fear of crime, depend on culturally embedded meanings of risk. For example,
immigrant cultures may be interpreted as the cause of social radicalization that mounts up to threats to
internal security; a user security culture may be interpreted as a social firewall against IT security
offences, etc.
CULTURE AND THE LIMITS OF URBAN SECURITY BY DESIGN
Approaches such as “designing out” are taken to reduce related risks by appropriately shaped built
infrastructure. The approach to “designing out” crime and terrorism (practical examples include
Geason/Wilson 1989) assumes that certain types and locations of urban space are significantly more
attractive to perpetrators than others, mainly for social and cultural reasons. Therefore, the choice of
urban targets is seen as mainly driven by factors such as maximum visibility of casualties, vulnerable
and actually harmed people, maximum media exposure and potential for vast spread of fear among the
wider population.
Also on the governmental level, concepts like designing out crime and designing in (security)
community have been introduced as counter terrorism protective security strategies (e.g. HM
Government 2012a, b). They provide guidance for local authorities for preparing local development
documents, in order to protect crowded places from international terrorist targeting. The UK
authorities aim for the creation of safer buildings and places to decrease terrorist attacks and
vulnerability. This example illustrates that urban planning in general, and the designing out approach
in particular, are fundamental mitigation instruments vis-à-vis urban security risks.
Provided guidance includes advice, how to incorporate counter terrorism protective security measures
into high design quality, and how to improve security of existing buildings and public realm as well as
environments. Specific requirements for transport facilities (e.g. airports, railways and ports) are
communicated. Counter-terrorism good design is considered to include risk response and integrating
protective security measures. Design principles should be considered as early as possible in planning
and development processes and are promoted by the government.
In contrast to designing out, inclusive concepts, such as “appreciative planning” (Ameyaw 2000),
focus on an inclusive, participatory planning process in/for multicultural metropolitan environment(s):
“‘Appreciative planning’ is an approach to urban planning in a multicultural context. Appreciative
planning is a model based on mutual respect, trust, and care-based action. It is a two-way learning
and problem-solving approach to planning. Appreciative planning is a multi-faceted process that
unites rational and nonrational processes of social interaction and social learning to enable citizens
and professionals to share the work of problem solving and decision-making for the benefit of
their communities. By so doing, it enables planners to celebrate the valuable assets multicultural
groups bring to city life and planning deliberations.” (Ameyaw 2000: 101).
The appreciative concept can also be understood as a social tool to confront “the real conflicts, issues,
dissent, and trade-offs in city planning.” (Ameyaw 2000: 101) The purpose is to “create contexts in
which planners and multicultural groups can continuously learn and experiment, think systematically,
engage in meaningful dialogue, and create visions that energize action and inclusion in city planning.”
(ibid.)
The cultural selection of risks (Douglas/Wildavsky 1982: 8) – a core component of the concept of
security culture as addressed above – has also been reflected in urban studies, for example by the
community safety approach (e.g. Matthews/Pitts 2001). This approach advocates a general shift in
infrastructural, political and public conceptions of security, from situational prevention to safety of a
community as a whole. This requires a particular “multicultural sensibility for planning”, including
how cultures, “which prescribe members’ relations with the community, orient their actions, and,
among other things, suggest how they might use formal planning processes.” (Baum 2000: 115)
Based on the concept of security culture, urban research as well as urban planning should in particular
consider the following main messages:
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•

Get to know culture: Familiarize with public security cultures, which influence citizens’
acceptance of urban security planning decisions and built environment resulting from those
planning decisions.

•

Mind cultural meaning: Consider the influence of culture on urban structure and of urban
planning on culture, bearing in mind that culture aspects go beyond preserving historic
artefacts and protecting the traditional image of the city. Culture is linked to dynamic societal
processes, and co-determines the meaning that citizens ascribe to built urban structure. These
processes cannot be planned and meaning cannot just be socially transmitted by design of
urban space.

•

Analyze risks comprehensively: Use the culture of risk of a society in order to determine
security aspects in urban planning and needs to protect that may be overlooked by
technological approaches to risk analysis.

•

Integrate cultural components of resilience: Consider in resilience-enhancing planning that
resilience and the vulnerabilities towards which that planning is directed include elements of
public culture – such as citizens’ morale and societal preparedness, social networks, etc.
Planning should work with – not over or against – those aspects. Resilience as capability to
learn and adapt to changing environment essentially involves societal characteristics. This
involves styles of how citizens perceive urban environment and security (gaps), as well as
their expectations how this should be addressed by authorities.

SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF CRITICALITY OF INFRASTRUCTURE BY CITIZENS
Structural and social dimensions of a public area overlap each other, as citizen acceptance and
demands with regard to urban planning decisions and their results cut across consideration of culture
and ethics aspects. At the same time, a public space is also a social place. Such a place needs time to
develop its identity and image. Urban planning considers the fact that public spaces are used by
different types of people, with different necessities, usage and mobility needs. Urban strategic
planning is an essentially dynamic process in the evolution of cities; and active participation of
citizens is crucial for a better urban development. Civil society is more or less active in all planningrelevant sectors.
Each city and community is distinct – with specific population characteristics, physical spaces,
government structures, values and history. Thus, each city and community will have its own particular
security problems, some of which will be more important for the community to deal with right away
than others. The involvement of citizens by identifying their needs, selecting priorities and strategies
offers better chances for developing solutions that are sustainable, feasible, and which citizens are
more willing to accept or implement. A major issue is how city administration can incorporate the
ideas provided by an active civil society into administrative processes. Public participation in the
urban decision-making process can be implemented through a number of tools, such as stakeholder
analysis, city consultations and working groups.
Factors that affect citizen’s perception of risk automatically have an impact on their acceptance for risk
reduction strategies and, vice versa, security and resilience enhancing planning of urban built
environment.
Physical infrastructure is in particular acknowledged to be critical, and planning of such infrastructure
is usually integrated in regional and urban planning as well as development. Future infrastructure
planning will require consideration of specific security aspects, both in technical and physical terms,
but also in psychological and more general citizen-related terms.
A security culture point of view includes the assumption that the ‘criticality’ of a certain infrastructure
and needs for protective measures, including by urban planning, does not only follow risk assessment
models and methods. They also follow citizens’ perceptions and needs. Urban planning should be
responsive to those perceptions and needs if it seeks to contribute to resilience from a comprehensive
point of view.
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Moreover, failure of built critical infrastructure has an impact on the social components of a system
and poses a threat to the functioning of society. If an infrastructure-endangering event occurs, domino
effects and/or cascading effects are very likely due to interference or outages of the critical
infrastructure. Those effects have the potential to bring different sectors of society to standstill. In
addition to direct harm to citizens and economic losses, this can generate also loss of confidence in the
political system. Complexity of social consequences from critical infrastructure failure mounts with
increasing citizens’ dependence on the respective infrastructure, including critical services.
Furthermore, crisis behaviour also depends on the predominant social patterns and legal frameworks,
on the general legitimacy of political, economic and social institutions, and on the amount of risk
tolerance of the population.
Risk research has shown the citizens’ assessment of risks and threats to be considerably dependent on
knowledge of precedents, frequency and extent of risk experience as well as perceived immediate
effects on themselves (Proske 2004). This includes factors rooted in perception that do not match with
the objective risk, and the extent that they are being brought to attention by, for instance, the media.
In line with such insights, the following can be concluded from previous studies (Siedschlag/Jerković
2010): The acceptance of protective measures by the population essentially depends on individual risk
perception against the backdrop of individual experiences, which is the most common cue that people
have to make guesses about the impact the measures are going to have. The acceptance of security
interventions (such as designing out crime and terrorism or designing in security, for example by
surveillance technology) is determined by individual experience and often happens on a case-by-case
basis. An important predictor of acceptance by the public is the adaptation of the intervention model to
specific national, regional and/or local requirements. European citizens do not believe that enhanced
technologies and infrastructure alone can eliminate insecurity.
What people perceive is real for them, at least in its consequences (cf. the so-called Thomas theorem:
Thomas/Thomas 1928: 571-572); so their behaviour will be influenced not by the actual level of
security, but of their perception of it. Urban planning decisions can distract citizens’ risk perception
from more objective risk levels.
Conversely, citizens’ risk perception can also result in societal demands on urban planning. Several
specific aspects, as addressed in the following, are worth consideration in strategic urban planning.
These aspects include indicators for citizens’ subjective perception of criticality of infrastructure and
need to protect it, including by appropriate urban planning measures. Conversely, infrastructure that
results from urban planning may also influence subjective assessment of its criticality and contribution
to security or susceptibility to natural or anthropogenic (‘man made’) risk.
Risk perception is strongly influenced by various subjective factors that drag it from objective risk
figures. These include overconfidence, loss aversion, individual experience, temporal factors, capacity
of remembering, level of information and knowledge, public discourse, stigmatization, cultural factors,
orientation of values, confidence in institutions, etc. (cf. Covello u.a. 2001: 382-391; OECD 2003: 5456; Proske 2004: 167-174; Slovic u.a. 1981; Sterr u.a. 2008: 345-346; Zwick/Renn 2008: 85-95).
Adequate risk management and public communication can help urban planners to prevent negative
effects from public risk perception, or misperception, and related public demands on or acceptance of
urban design. Addressing of risk in planning should be coherent with societal risk perception and
views (cf. OECD 2003: 54-56).
To do so, the complexity of individual and social mechanisms of risk perception has to be appreciated
(Coppola 2007: 162). Humans usually do not fear statistically highly ranked threats to life and health
(such as car accidents, food poisoning, cancer and others), whereas they are disproportionately wary of
spectacular hazards, even if related vulnerabilities are low.
In considering how to address perception of risk in urban research and planning, one can follow
Coppola’s (2007: 164-166) distinction between fear-related and knowledge-related factors:
•

Fear-related factors:
o Risks causing pain and death are generally feared (e.g. shark attack vs. heart attack);
o Controllable risks tend to be feared less than uncontrollable risks (such as air trips, urban
criminality, terrorism, food contamination);
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o Disasters with global impacts are feared more than those with regional impacts (nuclear war
vs. conventional war);
o Lethal risks are feared more (air crashes vs. car accidents);
o Risks equal to all population groups are feared less than risks effecting particular subgroups (especially children);
o Collective risks are feared more than individual risks;
o Risks exceeding life spans are more alarming;
o Risks that are hard to prevent cause greater fear;
o Decreasing risks (e.g. due to mitigation such as immunization) are feared less;
o Involuntary risks are feared more;
o Direct affection (e.g. 9/11) raises fear of risk;
o Avoidable risks cause less fear (e.g. due to medical progress such as AIDS).
•

Knowledge-related factors:
o
o
o
o
o

Invisible Risks (e.g. smoke vs. genetic engineering);
Risks with unknown degree of exposure;
Risks having delayed effects;
New/unknown risks;
Scientifically implausible risks.

From the security point of view, it is important to not only consider objective criticality of
infrastructure and reflect resilience-enhancing measures in urban planning but to also consider
citizens’ requirements for resilient infrastructure. These citizen requirements are of subjective nature
and can hardly be addressed by standard planning assumptions. However, they have considerable
impact on citizens’ acceptance of urban planning decisions and on whether security by design of built
environment matches societal security (cf. Davis 1999, introducing the concept of the “ecology of
fear”).
Addressing citizens’ felt risks to urban infrastructure and needs to protect that infrastructure provides a
foundation for optimizing public risk communication and for prioritizing protective measures. This
also needs considering in urban planning. In a review of relevant case studies, the project SFI@SFU 5
funded in the Austrian national security research programme KIRAS identified a list of indicators for
how characteristics of built urban environment influence citizens’ security-related perception of that
infrastructure. The results are shown in Table 1 below.
These results could inform strategic urban planning and support the urban planner in an approach to
security by design, considering aspects of the “ecology of fear” (Davis 1999) from the early stages of
planning processes for built environment.

5
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Table 1: List of indicators to assess citizens’ felt risks to urban infrastructure and needs to protect it. 6
Indicator
Experienced/expected
extent/duration/season of
harm to infrastructure
Direct experience of harm to
infrastructure
Impact on/impairment of
one’s own life due to
protection measures (e.g.
traffic obstruction due to
security checks)
Irreversibility of impact on
infrastructure and its effects
(such as cascading effects
from supply disruptions or
material loss)
Individual dependence on
infrastructure (e.g. water and
food supply)
Degree of physical effects
caused by harm to infrastructure (e.g. supply chain
breakdown)
Evidence of direct benefit
from infrastructure
Optional use of infrastructure
Controllability of
use/functioning of the
infrastructure
Familiarity with infrastructure
and comprehension of its
functioning
Spectacularity of
infrastructure and media
attention for (potential) harm
to infrastructure
Unique identity and cultural
value of the infrastructure
(e.g. St. Peter’s basilica in
Rome, etc.)
Detailed media coverage on
the effects of risks/harm to
infrastructure

6

Effects on citizens’ felt risks to urban
infrastructure and needs to protect
Multiplication of breakdown consequences (e.g.
power breakdown in winter season; disruption
of passenger transport) increase citizens’ felt
risks to urban infrastructure and needs to
protect.
Visibility and direct experience increase
citizens’ felt risks to urban infrastructure and
needs to protect.
The individual ratio of expected benefits from
protective measures and expected costs
influences citizens’ felt risks to urban
infrastructure and needs to protect.

Methods to determine
the effects
Interviews and surveys;
analyses of available
case-studies (e.g. on
power breakdowns)
Analyses of available
case-studies (e.g. on
nuclear accidents or on
supply)
Interviews and surveys;
behaviour analyses

Irreversibility increases citizens’ felt risks to
urban infrastructure and needs to protect.

Interviews and surveys

Individual dependence increases citizens’ felt
risks to urban infrastructure and needs to
protect.
Physical effects increase citizens’ felt risks to
urban infrastructure and needs to protect.

Interviews and surveys;
analyses on consumption
patterns
Analyses of available
case-studies (e.g. on
power breakdowns)

Perceived direct benefit of an infrastructure
increases its acceptance compared to and
increases citizens’ felt risks to urban
infrastructure and needs to protect.
“Voluntariness” and alternatives for
infrastructure use decrease citizens’ felt risks to
urban infrastructure and needs to protect.
Perception of own capability to control the
infrastructure decreases citizens’ felt risks to
urban infrastructure and needs to protect.
By trend, familiarity decreases citizens’ felt
risks to urban infrastructure and needs to
protect.
High spectacularity and media attention increase
citizens’ felt risks to urban infrastructure and
needs to protect.

Interviews and surveys;
analyses of user
frequency

Disruption/destruction of culturally valued
infrastructure triggers identity crises such as
deep uncertainty; it increases citizens’ felt risks
to urban infrastructure and needs to protect.
The more details media reports contain, the
higher citizens’ felt risks to urban infrastructure
and needs to protect.

Interviews and surveys;
analyses of
demographic/statistical
data
Media analyses

This is mainly derived from SFI@SFU project results, see footnote 5.

Interviews and surveys
Interviews and surveys
Interviews and surveys;
regression analyses
Interviews and surveys;
media analyses
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Indicator
Association of infrastructure
with maintenance or
improvement of material
status
Direct/indirect exposure of
self owned infrastructure to
risk/harm

Effects on citizens’ felt risks to urban
infrastructure and needs to protect
Expected restriction of one’s own lifestyle
increases felt risks to urban infrastructure and
needs to protect.

Methods to determine
the effects
Interviews and surveys

Perceived high degree of exposure increases
citizens’ felt risks to urban infrastructure and
needs to protect.

Index of employees of
affected business/
industry sectors;
customer/client analyses
Determination of
dependent clients and
entrepreneurs;
customer/client analyses;
entrepreneur surveys
Determination of
ownership structure;
interviews and surveys

Experienced/expected
individual economic
loss/economic cascading
effects

This increases citizens’ felt risks to urban
infrastructure and needs to protect.

Ownership structure of
infrastructure

Citizens’ felt risks to urban infrastructure and
needs to protect can be influenced according to
ownership structure (public vs. private owners;
domestic/foreign owners).
A preference for protection of local/close
infrastructure is common, so that proximity
usually increases citizens’ felt risks to urban
infrastructure and needs to protect.
Perceived affection of vulnerable groups
increases citizens’ felt risks to urban
infrastructure and needs to protect.

Geographical vicinity to
infrastructure
Effects of risk/harm to
infrastructure on vulnerable
groups (children, elderly in
need of care)
Known vulnerability of
infrastructure

Risk of disaster from harm to
infrastructure
Anthropogenic risk/harm to
infrastructure (e.g. human
failure, false usage, accidents,
terrorist acts, etc.)

Knowledge of vulnerability can either increase
or decrease citizens’ felt risks to urban
infrastructure and needs to protect (“will happen
again” effect, known as reflective fear vs. “has
already happened and will not happen again”
effect, known as over-amplification)
Highly perceived/known disaster risk increases
citizens’ felt risks to urban infrastructure and
needs to protect.
This usually decreases citizens’ felt risks to
urban infrastructure and needs to protect

Interviews and surveys

Interviews and surveys

Interviews and surveys;
oral history/narrative
interviews

Risk analyses;
interviews and surveys;
regression analyses
Risk analyses;
Interviews and surveys;
regression analyses
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Public perception of social impacts in case of urban critical infrastructure damage or failure, as
illustrated in Figure 1, is a further example that provides interesting information on societal (citizencentred) security aspects and concerns.
Figure 1: Perceived social impacts in case of urban critical infrastructure failure and identified types of
social impact.

Overcrowding of
temporary
care
facilities

Social
impacts in
case of CI
failure

Power Supply
Water Supply
Public Health
(Tele-)Communication
Transportation Systems

Consolidation of
social
relationships

Insurance Industry

Through physical loss of structures, homes, plant closures, etc. communities also suffer from negative
psycho-social consequences and are not only affected economically. Recovery through an efficient
organizational response reduces such negative effects. Urban planning considering security aspects
can contribute essentially to enhance efficiency, ease response activities, and reduce negative
perceptions as well as psycho-social consequences.
Urban research and planning should be aware that citizens always assess risks, threats and
uncertainties on a subjective and individual basis. To a certain extent, gaps between felt and factual
security are normal phenomena. Therefore, an analysis of the distribution of gaps between felt and
factual security across society is more important than a mere gap analysis. In the case of risks that
citizens perceive as out of their ability to change, such as risks to large urban built infrastructure,
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citizens will usually discount or even discharge a risk, which opens a gap between felt and factual
security (Parfit 1998).
Counterterrorism security measures are an important case in point. Especially their visibility and
proportionality intersects everyday life of citizens by influencing individual and collective experience
of life in urban areas. Therefore, counter-terrorist urban design poses particular challenges in the light
of human factors that influence citizens’ perception of risk to built infrastructure, needs to protect, and
acceptance of protective measures.
Coaffee (2010: 940-42) has identified challenges to be considered by built environment professionals
(planners, architects, etc.) in their planning activities. A particularly important one is the societal
impact of physical changes of urban areas, as result of implemented counterterrorism measures in the
urban environment. Planners, architects and urban designers need to integrate not only effective
protective counterterrorism security into the design of urban objects with severe terrorism risk but also
consider the visible impact of security measures. It is recommended to design these as unobtrusive as
possible. For example, to delimit security zones in governmental areas, it is recommended to use
stealthy balustrades instead of bollards. This also serves the purpose to avoid building largely visible
“defensible space”, thus outlining to everybody the vulnerability of the fortressed built environment.
Critical urban infrastructure and physical protective measures should still suggest a sense of
welcoming, openness and democracy (Coaffee 2010: 940). Secure urban areas need the intervention of
trained people, who have the capability to recognize dangerous situations with terrorist potential.
Availing people with the sense to prevent and respond to terrorist activity is far less costly and often
more effective than planning and implementing ‘anti-terrorist’ built environment.
To sum up, future urban research and planning should bear in mind the following when addressing
citizen acceptance and demands aspects related to secure urban space:
•

Consider that even the best planning decisions, appropriately addressing the security
dimension, and their implementation, are not self-enforcing but need to be embedded in citizen
acceptance: A public space is also a social place. Therefore, structural and social dimensions
of a public area overlap each other, as citizen acceptance and demands cut across consideration
of culture and ethics aspects.

•

Do not apply a ‘one size fits all’ approach to citizen acceptance: Each city and community is
distinct, with specific population characteristics, physical spaces, government structures,
values and history. Each will thus have its particular security problems and public security
cultures that co-determine, whether urban design will be accepted by citizens and used
appropriately. Addressing of security aspects in urban planning should be grounded on a
holistic view by incorporating, in a balanced way, the following five interconnected functional
components: social, economic, political, demographic, and environmental.

•

Respond to citizens needs: Citizens always assess risks, threats and uncertainties on a
subjective and individual basis. To a certain extent, gaps between felt and factual security are
normal phenomena. Even if not supported by other, more technical ways of risk assessment,
integrating citizens’ needs in urban planning will strengthen its addressing of security issues
and contribution to enhancing urban resilience.

•

Implement insight from social sciences: Implementing insights from social sciences in all
stages of urban planning, such as cultural and ethics aspects addressed above, contributes to
building resilience cities. Resilience essentially includes societal resilience, and this is linked
to citizens’ acceptance of security-enhancing measures. For that reason, security by design
should as well consider the visible impact of security measures and should be unobtrusive as
possible.
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ETHICS ASPECTS
Citizen-related aspects should always be part of security and related considerations in urban planning
since citizens are its ultimate end-users. However, it is not easy to address citizens by built
infrastructure in order – for example – to influence their behaviour using that infrastructure. The
reason for this is that – among other things due to culture aspects – citizens ‘read’ built urban
environment in different ways: One central tenet in environmental psychology (cf. Nasar 2011) is that
meaning intentionally embodied in built environment is not always decoded by citizens according to
that intention. From the psychological point of view, environmental cognition cannot be just designed
because “the perception of insecurity in cities depends largely upon the substantial amount and
constant flow of information that urban residents receive from many sources.” (UN-HABITAT 2007a:
19)
Thus, urban planning is trying to avoid stressful and potentially threatening feelings of being lost in
the urban realm, and resulting perceived threat, by providing “legibility” (Lynch 1960). That means to
design built infrastructure in such a way that “one can comprehend and navigate environments” (Nasar
2011: 165). The lesson is that it would be a mistake to believe we can consider all aspects of security
only through ways of planning, such as “designing out” crime or “designing in” protection and
resilience. Therefore, it is important that urban designs “incorporate public meanings” and citizens’
images of places (Nasar 2011: 166), including – one can add – those of secure places. As a result, also
the identification of “weak points” in urban environments from a security culture point of view has to
be seen as socially negotiated and constructed sense-making that takes place in cultural contexts
(Falkheimer/Heide 2006).
Debates in urban design have often disregarded this aspect, rather centring on “which good design
determines good behavior” (cf. Whitzman 2011: 670). However, additional aspects should be
considered in order to arrive at a holistic view. Social conflict between different social groups about
public space is a democratic phenomenon that should not be subject to designing out. Security aspects
of urban design should not be overly mainstreamed because planning to increase security of excluded
groups may also contribute to making cities safer. Desire for security should not lead urban planning
to contributing to threatening citizens’ lawful rights of expression and dissent, owing to the old
principle that city air should make people free, rather than constrain them (cf. Whitzman 2011: 670671).
Moreover, “designing in” and “designing out” approaches have been criticized for an infrastructurebased “clubbing of private security”, which contributes to the deconstruction of security as a public
good to the benefit of a short-sighted approach of mere physical risk reduction. (Hope 2001: 216)
Critics may also draw from Waltzer (1983: 20), who condemned the blurring of distribution criteria for
security and: “[P]rivate security should not be denied to people who do not possess some other good –
for example, wealth”. Others have criticized the production of security by use of exclusionary
practices (Hughes 2007) and called for communitarian reasoning to reconcile the idea of security with
that of community (Loader/Walker 2007).
While the public interest is a question of continuous debate, both in its general principles and case-bycase applications, it requires a conscientiously held view of the policies and actions that best serve the
entire community. The “ethical planning pyramid” (Brucelius s.a.) illustrates the different elements
and levels of abstraction that ethics has in planning processes: Ethics, power and responsibility at the
planning system level stand versus the everyday morality at individual level – with flows running in
both directions through planning techniques and judgements as well as ethics in planning and policy
documents.
This also applies to the gender perspective:
“[G]ender is not only about women in society. It is about the ways women and men interact and
their ability to access resources and opportunities in their communities depending on their being a
woman or a man. Therefore, when any type of survey or analysis of a society is undertaken, it is
important to have data that reflects the situation of women in comparison to the situation of men
and vice versa“. (UN-HABITAT 2007b: 28)
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Women and men have different perceptions of security, which leads to different urban protection needs
(cf. Women’s Initiatives for Safer Environments 2005). Understanding the various situations,
individual needs and perspectives of men and women should inform all aspects of urban planning and
management (UN-HABITAT 2007b: 26), as summarized in Table 2. It is important to clarify what a
gender perspective actually means when undertaking security-related urban planning.
Table 2: The meaning of a gender perspective in the urban planning process. 7
Having a Gender Perspective in urban planning
does NOT mean …

Having a Gender Perspective in urban planning
DOES involve …

Focusing only on women

Looking at the inequalities between men and women

Treating women only as a vulnerable group

Recognizing that both men and women are actors in
the planning process

Treating women and men exactly the same

Designing planning strategies that take the inequalities
and differences of men and women into account

Striving for numerically equal participation between
men and women

Moving beyond only counting the number of male and
female participants to focus on the substance of their
involvement as well as the impact of planning on men
and women

Assuming that all women (or men) will have the same
interests, views or priorities

Recognizing the differences between different groups
of men and women (based on age, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, etc.)

Focusing only on employment equity issues within
organizations

Recognizing that equal opportunities for women
within organizations is only one aspect of gender
equality

Assuming who does what work and who has what
responsibilities

Understanding the specific situation and documenting
the actual conditions and priorities

In summary, from a state of the art review, the following main messages for addressing ethics aspects
of security in urban research and planning derive:
•

Address ethics aspects in an investigative way: Decisions about how to configure and live
within the built environment have ethics dimensions that are sometimes hard to see.

•

Critically address planning requirements, including identified culture aspects of security, in
the light of ethics aspects: For example, security by design should be checked against risks of
deconstructing security as a public good (such as common accessibility of public space, etc.).

•

Identify risks of creating uneven distribution of security in society: Urban design addressing
security aspects may unconsciously contribute to selective delivery of security, contributing to
making secure or wealthy citizens more secure, and vulnerable or less prosperous citizens
more vulnerable.

•

Actively contribute to limiting potential for (e.g. criminal or terrorist) abuse of sensitive
planning information and data.
Involve citizens in planning decisions: This not only increases legitimacy of planning
decisions, but it is also a requirement from basic principles such as ownership and community
goals.

•

•

7

Consider the various situations, perceptions of (in)security, needs and perspectives of men and
women: Such consideration should inform all aspects of urban planning, which should
actively identify and respond to gender-specific perceptions of security and needs for
protective measures.

Source: UN-HABITAT (2007a): 26.
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COMMUNITY RESILIENCE IN THE URBAN CONTEXT
In the context of societal security, resilience typically refers to a community as a whole. In security
research, resilience is an evolving concept and most often used as a descriptor for a state of the system.
However, various authors agree on resilience not being an equilibrium state but being a dynamic
property or process, changing and being variable over time (e.g. Lorenz 2010; Norris et al. 2008;
Cutter et al. 2008). For example, Cutter (s.a.: 3) proposes to define resilience as including “those
inherent conditions that allow the system to absorb impacts and cope with an event, as well as those
post-event adaptations that help the system to change and learn and thus achieve an acceptable level of
functioning.”
A comprehensive approach to security aspects in urban planning should also reflect that in urban
systems all phases of the common crisis management cycle may be experienced simultaneously in
different parts of the city: While one part of the city may be struck by an incident (such as a natural
disaster or terrorist attack), other parts may be under warning, evacuation, or even in an immediate
post-disaster phase with restoration (e.g. of supply-related infrastructure) beginning. Still other parts of
a city may be in the role of observers and drawing immediate lessons for risk assessment, mitigation,
prevention and preparedness.
While there are various conceptions of resilience, urban studies have linked resilience back to its
ecological origins and applied as a concept within the context of environmental psychology. This
concept has been placed in a socio-political context to arrive at a notion of resilience that focuses on
macro-resilience of an urban society as a whole (cf. Coaffee/Wood/Rogers 2009: 110-122). On the
bottom line, resilience can be considered as the degree to which a system (e.g. an urban environment
as a structural and as a social system) is capable of organizing itself to increase its capacity for
learning from past disruptions for better future protection and improved risk reduction (cf. Sapirstein
2009).
By adopting resilience as a clear and pragmatic policy goal, aiming to invest in fostering community
resilience, communities are supposed to achieve an improved position to withstand disruptions and to
recover and re-establish more easily (cf. Cutter et al. 2010) – that is, to be more resilient vis-à-vis
vulnerabilities.
The message for urban planning is that it should contribute to building a system (of both social and of
built environment) “to either absorb or respond to negative external influences or to more generalized
experiences of perturbation” (Coaffee/Wood/Rogers 2009: 122).
In summary, the conceptual state of the art is that there are four interrelated dimensions to resilience:
technical, organizational, social, and economic. This illustrates that, especially in urban systems,
resilience cannot be comprehensively addressed merely from the technical or structural point of view.
Based on this tenet, in particular with respect to planning for secure systems of different kinds,
resilience can be described to be based on the following characteristics:
•

It reflects the extent of change that a system can experience, while retaining its order or its
normative (formal) as well as its dynamic organization.

•

It reflects the capability level of a system for self-organization.

•

It requires both acceptance by as well as symmetric competences of the citizens.

•

It reflects the capability of a system to learn and adapt to changing environments, while
retaining its characteristics and identity (or, technically, its operational closure).

Applying a comprehensive approach to urban planning can help increase societal resilience because it
acknowledges that an urban system can be confronted with all the phases of the crisis management
cycle simultaneously. Essentially, resilience thinking in the urban planning process should be
grounded on a holistic view by incorporating the following five interconnected functional
components: social, economic, political, demographic, and environmental (cf. Pelling 2003: 12).
Approaches such as “New Urbanism” (e.g. Calthorpe/Fulton 2001) have argued that citizen resilience
could be increased by informed, progressive architectural design, that per se would meliorate human
behaviour and reduce insecurity as well as citizens’ feeling thereof. However, this physical
determinism will not hold. Perceptions of the ‘users’ of a city/an urban environment have to be
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essentially taken into account. Urban research and planning should be sensitive to societal security
cultures and, in particular, consider citizens’ perception of insecurity, feeling of vulnerability and
acceptance of technological solutions for security problems. For example, while the need to provide
for sufficient lighting clearly shapes the planning process of urban public space, thorough analysis of
the relevant users and user groups are required to better assess how lighting can contribute to heighten
individual security perception and to reduce ‘fear’ in public space.
Increasing urban resilience at the citizen level also requires addressing and understanding of
vulnerability (Medd/Marvin 2005). While vulnerability in general is the susceptibility (of a
community and/or an infrastructure) to the impact of hazards, the concept of vulnerability as applied in
planning should in particular “involve a predictive quality: it is supposedly a way of conceptualizing
what may happen to an identifiable population under conditions of particular risk and hazards.”
(Cannon et al. 2003: 4).
The following general checklist for consideration of the citizen perspective in addressing security
issues in urban planning derives from the aspects addressed in this chapter:
•

Identify and involve all relevant actors in the process of urban planning, including active
citizen participation;

•

Consider the non-linearity based on the fact that in urban systems all phases of the common
crisis management cycle may be experienced simultaneously in different parts of the city;

•

Reflect that resilience in cities should be grounded in a holistic view of sustainability;

•

Appreciate individual perceptions of security (e.g. on the level of regional or national
patterns);

•

Identify areas of concern and address them specifically, without extrapolating to the planning
of the city as a whole;

•

Combine urban planning with raising of citizens’ awareness;

•

Contribute to identifying individual as well as group-specific vulnerabilities and methods to
increase resilience;

•

Based on the acknowledgement that public urban space is about living and evolving, not about
being watched and observed, planning decisions should provide sufficient space for later
changes and adaptations.

SECURITY-RELATED MISSIONS IN URBAN PLANNING
As a comprehensive conclusion, a number of security-related missions in the context of urban
planning – addressing culture and ethics aspects in urban security – can be derived from the research
reported in this paper, in some cases connecting to missions identified in preceding work. They are
listed in the Table 3, along with some examples. The missions are assigned one or more practical
method(s) to meet the challenge. Naturally, there are crossovers between missions, for example
between women’s security and perception of security. Nevertheless, it may be helpful for societal
security considerations in urban planning to use the listed missions as some type of checklist.
In addition to more general results on culture and ethics aspects, those missions represent a pragmatic
sum-up of the results and contribution of the undertaken study to identify clusters of societal security
aspects that future urban research and planning should address more prominently.
The idea of defining security-related “missions” follows the founding idea of European security
research and its mission-centred approach to address capability development and further measures to
meet challenges grouped in different clusters (cf. European Communities 2006).
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Table 3: Summary of security-related missions in urban planning, addressing societal security aspects –
and assigned practical methods to meet the challenge.
Security-related
mission
Enhance women's
security

Example/illustration
Situation analysis for
planning safe cities, e.g.
“What times of day or
night do women and girls
go out most often? What
times of day or night do
women and girls go out
least often? Why?”
Which groups of women
in the city or community
most often experience
violence or insecurity?

Tool/method to meet the
challenge

Source/reference

Safety audit, e.g. women’s
safety audit by the
Metropolitan Action
Committee on Violence
Against Women and
Children
(http://www.metrac.org/pr
ograms/safe/audits.htm),
based on diverse audit
group members so to
reflect a broad spectrum of
safety concerns. An
example for a safety audit
checklist is available on
http://www.redmujer.com.
ar/pdf_publicaciones/safet
y_audits_checklist.pdf

UN Entity for Gender
Equality and the
Empowerment of
Women (UN Women):
http://www.endvawnow.
org/en/articles/262-askquestions-aboutwomens-safety-in-thecity.html

Address/design in
responses to
citizens’ felt risks to
urban
infrastructure and
needs to protect

Certain artefacts as present
in urban areas can distract
citizens' perception of risk
from the more ‘objective’
level of risk. For example,
citizens tend to perceive
monumental infrastructure
as more critical than less
conspicuous infrastructure,
sometimes irrespective of
its known function.

List of indicators derived
from risk research to
determine relevant kinds
of infrastructure and
properly address the issue
of perceived criticality in
urban planning.

KIRAS project
SFI@SFU:

Prevent emotional
and radical
reactions to
“privatized” public
spaces

Examples from urban
planning include the
concept of offering
citizens new middle-class
type privacy in private
public spaces, such a
commercial malls based on
architectures “to separate
out different ‘types’ of
people” and including
commercial policing by
private companies.

Advocacy Planning,
Participatory Diagnosis,
Local Dialogue or
Dynamic Facilitation are
important methods to
identify different interests
and types of people in
using public spaces.

Garland (2001)

Reduce gaps
between felt and
factual security

“[T]he perception of
insecurity in cities depends
largely upon the
substantial amount and
constant flow of
information that urban
residents receive from
many sources.”

Multicultural crisis
communication to identify
“weak points” in urban
environments, e.g.
involving use of new
social media in citizen-togovernment/public
administration and
government/public
administration-to-citizen
communication.

United Nations Human
Settlements Programme
(UN-HABITAT
2007a, b)

http://www.sfi-sfu.eu
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Security-related
mission

Example/illustration

Tool/method to meet the
challenge

Source/reference

Zone certain
functional areas in
the city without
creating unequal
levels of security in
different areas
(“new urbanism”)

Overcome the zoning of
functional areas,
separating residential from
economy and other use.
Aim at a mix of residential
and economy-related
functions. Conceptually
foster the integration of
society into urbanity.

The zoning of certain
functional areas relies on
active citizen participation
– like Opinion Surveys,
Planning for Real, Local
Dialogue or Round Tables
– in the construction and
development of urban
neighbourhoods.

Calthorpe/Fulton (2001)

Designing out crime

Even if there are things
that go wrong in society
(which may lead to
crimes), designing urban
environment influences
offender decisions that
precede criminal acts by
affecting the built, social
and administrative
ambience.

Design can reduce the
incidence of many (urban
environment related)
crimes through, e.g.
laminated glass, framed
structures, bomb shelter
areas, good overview,
visibility, better street
lightening, accessibility,
etc.

Crime Prevention
Through Environmental
Design:

Counter terrorism
by design

To counter terrorism and
better protect people from
terrorist attacks in urban
places, it is important to
ensure the safety of public
spaces and buildings. In
this order, urban
environment should be
practical, sustainable,
affordable and attractive,
and should also give a
sense of security.

Guidelines for the
implementation of a better
blast resistance for
buildings, better building
management facilities,
better traffic management
and measures mitigating
the potential effects of
hostile vehicles, as well as
guidelines for creating a
better oversight of public
spaces.

HM Government
(2012b)

Implement a full
crisis management
cycle

From the point of view of
a comprehensive approach
in urban planning,
architects and planners
should also reflect that in
urban systems all phases of
the common crisis
management cycle may be
experienced
simultaneously in different
parts of the city.

The urban planning tool
should reflect that
resilience in cities should
be grounded in a holistic
view of sustainability and
consider social, economic,
political, demographic, and
environmental functional
components. Methods to
integrate these components
are Expert Forums,
Interviews, Local
Dialogue, Round Table,
and Future Workshops.

Pelling (2003)

Match built
environment with
citizen user cultures

The planning process of
urban environments should
consider that public space
is used by different social
groups. Value conflicts
and security problems
accumulated in specific
areas negatively impact
planning and everyday
use.

Discursive strategies and
related public
communication measures,
like Advocacy Planning,
Participatory Diagnosis,
Local Dialogue or
Dynamic Facilitation, are
important assets in
reducing public disorder
phenomena.

Participation and
sustainable development
in Europe:

http://www.CPTED.net

http://www.partizipation.
at/
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Security-related
mission

Ethics aspects in urban planning

Protect crowded
places

Distributive
justice (idea of
same security
[level] for all)
Sustainability
Legitimacy
Citizen rights
Acceptability of
planning
decisions
Protection of
personal data

Example/illustration

Tool/method to meet the
challenge

Source/reference

Crowded places (sports
stadiums, concert halls,
clubs/pubs,
exhibitions/museums,
shopping malls, etc.)
represent attractive targets
for terrorists or criminal
attacks.

Through efficient planning
of building structure,
windows and glazing,
parking and external areas,
building internal layout,
good building lighting and
continuous monitoring
systems, urban planners
can enhance the security of
crowded places.

HM Government
(2012b)

Ethics principles for all
who participate in the
process of environmental
planning derive both from
the general values of
society and from the
planner's special
responsibility to serve the
public interest. Ethics
aspects accentuate the
necessity for the highest
standards of fairness and
honesty among the
planning process.

Neosocratic Dialogue,
Participatory Diagnosis,
Dynamic Facilitation,
Safety Audits and
Checklists and Future
Workshops are important
methods to identify,
through citizen’s
participation, the different
ethics issues in
environmental planning.

The American Planning
Association: Ethical
principles in planning:
http://www.planning.org/
ethics/ethicalprinciples.ht
m
UN-HABITAT (2007b)

Gender
perspectives
(general)

As a first step ahead, these identified missions were assessed in an expert consultation. The purpose of
this consultation, conducted in February 2012, was:
•

To obtain some external validation of the study results from subject-matter experts;

•

To prioritize the missions and associated methods;

•

To gain insight on urban planning experts’ perception of the meaning/use of the concept of
security in urban planning.

The results provided insight from an international forum of urban planning experts to get an
understanding of their view of societal security aspects. The expert consultation was done via e-mail
with a questionnaire that was derived from Table 3 above. Results were used on an anonymous basis.
In that questionnaire, the identified security-related missions were listed, along with some illustrating
examples. Each mission was assigned to a main practical method to meet its challenge. 130 European
experts in urban planning identified by desk research were invited to assess the relevance of each
mission from their particular expert point of view. In the end, 13 filled-in questionnaires were
received. The resulting response rate of 10 per cent appears acceptable for an online survey, which
often has substantially lower turnout, and for the purpose of an expert consultation that does not seek
statistical relevance.
The answers were dissociated from the names of the respondents upon receipt and processed
completely anonymously. Respondents could rate the relevance of each mission either “very low”,
“low”, “medium”, “high”, or “very high”, from their particular expert point of view. Experts addressed
included urban and spatial planning researches and practitioners, including staff of urban planning
authorities at the city level, in different EU Member States. Experts from Austria, Germany, the UK,
Finland and Norway responded.
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Table 4 shows the ranking of the security-related missions in urban planning according to the
relevance assigned to them by the responding external experts.

Table 4: Results from external experts’ consultation: Assessed relevance of the security-related missions in
urban planning.
Relevance of security-related topics (culture, ethics, etc.) in urban planning missions from urban
planner point of view
Very high
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Zone certain functional areas in the city without creating unequal levels of security in different areas;
Prevent emotional and radical reactions to “privatized” public spaces;
Protect sensitive data (general);
Protect personal data;
Safety;
Public ownership;
Citizen rights.

High
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Consider citizens' subjective perception of criticality of (urban) infrastructure;
Designing out crime;
Match built environment with citizen user cultures;
Engineering and transportation infrastructures;
Environmental conditions;
Distributive justice (idea of same security level for all);
Sustainability;
Legitimacy;
Acceptability of planning decisions.

Medium
•
•
•
•
•

Reduce gaps between felt and factual security;
Use counter-terrorism by design;
Implement a full crisis management cycle;
Protect crowded places;
Enhance women's security.

Low
•

Gender perspectives (general).

The following results deserve special attention:
•

Missions in security-related urban planning and associated methods that address ethics issues
are assessed of high relevance;
o In particular, the experts emphasized the relevance of protection of sensitive and personal
data in planning processes, acknowledgment of the principle of public ownership and of
citizen rights;
o Experts also attached high relevance to the mission of zoning certain functional areas in the
city without creating unequal levels of security;
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o Experts moreover stressed the prevention of emotional and radical reactions to public
spaces that are perceived as being unduly “privatized” by urban planning and resulting built
infrastructure.
•

Experts further highlighted missions in security-related urban planning that relate to
infrastructure, including:
o Designing out crime;
o Environmental matching with cultural usage patterns;
o Sustainability;
o Considering citizens’ perception of criticality of (urban) infrastructure.

•

Further, experts confirmed the relevance of methods to assure acceptability and legitimacy of
planning decisions.

To the assessment of the responding experts, terrorism and natural disasters are issues with medium
relevance to strategic urban planning. Respondents clearly rank ethics aspects higher than countering
terrorism by design or protecting crowded places by design. At the same time, respondents consider
the implementation of gender-related aspects of low relevance as a security-related mission in urban
planning.
The results of the consultation indicate that urban planning experts do not commonly perceive relevant
security issues, such as terrorism or natural disasters, to touch their responsibility. In other words, they
do not see urban planning as a possible resilience-enhancing and mitigation instrument, or as an
activity that is immediately relevant to security. In the light of these results, further research should
among other things contribute to awareness raising and tailored information concerning the securityrelevant aspects of specific planning decisions and tools (such as designing in and designing out).
Knowledge from research about direct and indirect effects of urban planning decisions on societal
security and impacts of urban planning on urban vulnerability and resilience should be accumulated
and aptly transferred to the urban planning sector.
Important to notice, the consultation has at the same time shown that urban planners are aware of
general ethics issues to be considered within the planning process, and of citizens’ emotions,
perceptions and responses that can be triggered by certain planning results. They further acknowledge
citizens’ acceptance and the legitimacy of planning decisions to be aspects that should be addressed
and assured within the planning process.
The experts’ assessments can be transferred to a ranking of the security-related missions in urban
planning (as listed in Table 3) in the following order of relevance (Table 5):

Table 5: Prioritization of security-related missions in urban planning derived from the expert
consultation.

1. Zoning of functional areas in the city without creating unequal levels of security in different areas
(“new urbanism”)
2. Preventing emotional and radical reactions to “privatized” public spaces
3. Designing out crime
4. Consideration of ethics aspects in urban planning
Protection of personal data
Citizens’ rights
Distributive justice (idea of same security [level] for all)
Sustainability
Legitimacy
Acceptability of planning decisions
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CONCLUSION
In view of the growing vulnerability of urban environments, security and security culture aspects
should play a more prominent role within strategic urban planning. Various currents in urban theories
were identified to directly or indirectly relating to security aspects: New Urbanism with its sociospatial
perspective, the ecological perspective, appreciative planning, or the community safety approach each
comprise security aspects in terms of as urban structures and design, built environment and society
interact and affect each other. This should be considered in planning concepts and can be exploited for
security and resilience enhancing purposes. However, from the expert consultation it can be concluded
that urban planners are not always aware of their potential role in urban security and resilience,
contributing to societal security. Future research into urban security should involve according outreach
to end-user communities in the urban planning sector.
Urban research and planning on the one hand and societal security research and security policies on
the other should become more reciprocally engaged. In particular, they should consider security
culture aspects in a comprehensive way: First, culture determines the behaviour and perception of
people; second, cultural behaviour can be directed by the surroundings; third, the framework for urban
planning is culturally determined as well. In particular, urban planning – addressing culture and ethics
aspects – should increasingly consider subjective (perceived) criticality of infrastructure and reflect
resilience-enhancing measures.
To increase urban resilience not only in terms of infrastructure but also in terms of societal security
requires addressing public perception of insecurity, feeling of vulnerability and acceptance of
technological solutions for security problems.
Design of urban space and infrastructure always stands vis-à-vis affecting or even influencing social
behaviour and feelings. It thus needs to incorporate public meanings, to address citizens’ acceptance
and to assure the legitimacy of planning decisions. A dynamic process in the evolution of resilient
cities needs active participation of citizens. This is even more the case since citizens’ risk perception
determines their acceptance of risk reduction strategies and can also result in new societal demands on
urban planning and on security missions that it should incorporate.
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